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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Martha Moore appeals, pursuant to her conditional guilty plea to possession of
methamphetamine, challenging the district court's order denying her motion to
suppress. She contends that the officers did not have her valid consent to search her
purse, located in her room, based on their assertion that they were searching pursuant
to her son's consent to searches as part of the terms of his probation. Since it was not
reasonable to believe that her son had joint control over either the purse in which the
methamphetamine was found or the room in which the purse was located, his waiver
did not give them the lawful authority to search either the purse or the room. Thus, their
representation of lawful authority to search pursuant to the son's waiver coerced any
consent Ms. Moore gave at that time. Furthermore, since the officers did not have a
signed agreement from Ms. Moore consenting to such searches, there is no justification
for the warrantless search. Thus, the search violated Ms. Moore's constitutional rights
and the evidence found during that illegal search should be suppressed.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Probation Officer Julie Guiberson, accompanied by four other armed and
uniformed police officers, went to Ms. Moore's home to execute an arrest warrant on
Ms. Moore's son, Ryan Mclnelly. (Tr., p.8, Ls.4-5, 22-25; Tr., p.35, Ls.15-23.) Officer
Guiberson was Mr. Mclnelly's supervising officer while he was on probation. (Tr., p.7,
Ls.16-19.)

While Ms. Moore's home was not Mr. Mclnelly's original residence on

probation, Officer Guiberson had approved it as a residence for Mr. Mclnelly, and he
had, to her knowledge, been living there at times. (Tr., p.27, L.25-p.28, L.11; Tr., p.13,
Ls.8-12.) Officer Guiberson had never asked Ms. Moore to sign a notification regarding
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the impact of having a probationer living in her house.

(Tr., p.27, L.15 - p.28, L.1.)

Officer Guiberson claimed to have discussed that issue with Ms. Moore (Tr., p.14, Ls.612), but Ms. Moore testified that no such discussion occurred. (Tr., p.80, Ls.6-8)
The arrest team was met at the door by Ms. Moore's other son, a teenager. 1
(Tr., p.15, Ls.16-18.) Ms. Moore was in the bathroom. (Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20.) Three of
the officers entered at the teenage son's invitation and Officer Guiberson waited for
Ms. Moore to exit the bathroom. (Tr., p.15, Ls.16-21; Tr., p.16, Ls.18-21 (identifying the
three officers who went into the house).)

While waiting, the officers performed a

protective sweep, but found no one else in the residence. (Tr., p.17, L.16 - p.18, L.1;
Tr., p.51, Ls.14-17.) When Ms. Moore finished in the bathroom, she tossed her purse
onto her bed, and went out to meet with the officers. (Tr., p.19, L.6 - p.20, L 14.) Officer
Guiberson found this conduct to be suspect. (Tr., p.20, Ls.12-23.)
Ms. Moore informed the officers that Mr. Mclnelly was not at the residence, but
was out looking for a job. (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-8.) Ms. Moore was able to get a hold of
Mr. Mclnelly by telephone and Officer Guiberson talked with him, confirmed that he was
job hunting, and ordered him to meet her at her office in fifteen minutes. (Tr., p.21,

Ms. Moore's teenage son and daughter live with her.
(Tr., p.74, Ls.11-22.)
Ms. Moore's husband would also normally be living in that house, but was incarcerated
at the time of the search. (Tr., p.100, Ls.17-24.) His belongings were in the room he
shared with Ms. Moore. (Tr., p.100, Ls.17-18.) And even though there was only one
bed in Ms. Moore's room (Tr., p.23, L.6), Officer Guiberson mistakenly believed
Mr. Mclnelly, his son (Ms. Moore's grandson), and Ms. Moore all shared that room.
(See, e.g., Tr., p.26, Ls.2-3.) Rather, when he was there, Mr. Mclnlley and his son
would sleep in one of the other rooms, which was furnished for their needs. (Tr., p.100,
Ls.3-13; see also Tr., p.55, Ls.1-16 (Officer Paula Aldous testifying that she observed
two beds in another room, in which the teenage son showed her some of Mr. Mclnelly's
clothes.) However, Ms. Moore indicated that Mr. Mclnelly was staying primarily with
another of her sons, who had his own residence. (Tr., p.82, L.24 - p.83, L.1.)
1
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L.18 - p.22, L.4.)

Rather than return to her office for the arranged meeting with

Mr. Mclnelly, Officer Guiberson decided she wanted to search the house, specifically,
Ms. Moore's purse. (See Tr., p.22, Ls.5-18.) She claimed that she wanted to be sure
the house was "a safe place for [Mr. Mclnelly] to live" while on probation (Tr., p.24, Ls.27), even though she was planning on arresting him for violating his probation by using
drugs. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-6.)
Ms. Moore testified that Officer Guiberson said she had a right to search the
whole home pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation.

(Tr., p.78, Ls.14-17;

Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10.) Officer Guiberson testified she could not remember whether she
had made such statements. (Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15.) However, Officer Tom Foltz (one of
the three officers who entered the home) testified that Officer Guiberson had given him
the impression that they had "a combined consent along with the probationary search of
the home." (Tr., p.64, Ls.21-24.) As a result of Officer Guiberson's claim that she had a
right to search the home pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation, Ms. Moore
permitted the search of the home. (See Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10; Tr., p.24, Ls.2-7.) However,
Ms. Moore maintains that she did not consent to a search of her purse.
Ls.13-14.)

(Tr., p.99,

Rather, Ms. Moore testified that Officer Guiberson searched the purse

without requesting permission to do so.

(Tr., p.83, Ls.19-22.)

However, Officer

Guiberson and Officer Aldous testified that Ms Moore consented to that search.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.17-22; Tr., p.52, L.24 - p.53, L.6.) Officer Guiberson did get Ms. Moore's
purse from the bedroom, searched it, and found methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia in the purse. (Tr., p.26, Ls.3-7.)
As a result, the State charged Ms. Moore with possession of methamphetamine.
(R., pp.26-27.) She filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse, claiming
3

the officers had no justification to search the purse. (R., pp.39-40, 44-47.) The State
responded that Ms. Moore "freely and voluntarily consented to the officer's search of her
purse and residence," and therefore, the search was valid. (R., pp.52-57.) The district
court determined, based on the clear weight of the evidence, that Mr. Mclnelly had been
living in Ms. Moore's home. (R., p.67.) It also ruled that "[a]s [Mr. Mclnelly's] probation
officer investigating a parole violation involving illegal drug use, Guiberson had the
authority and responsibility to search the home for evidence relating to possible
probation violations and to determine if the residence continued to be safe housing."
(R., p.67.) As a result, it determined that Ms. Moore consented to the search of her
home and her purse.

(R., pp.67-68.)

Therefore, it denied the motion to suppress.

(R., p.68.)
Ms. Moore entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the
district court's decision regarding her motion to suppress. (R., p.97.) The district court
ultimately granted Ms. Moore's request for a withheld judgment and placed her on
probation for four years.

(Tr., p.129, Ls.13-14; R., p.109.)

Ms. Moore filed a timely

notice of appeal pursuant to her conditional guilty plea. (R., pp.116-17.)

4

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence found during an illegal
search which was conducted without the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent consent of
Ms. Moore.

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Not Suppressing The Evidence Found During An Illegal
Search Which Was Conducted Without The Voluntary, Knowing, And Intelligent
Consent Of Ms. Moore

A

Introduction
Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against unreasonable,

searches and seizures.

In this case, officers represented that they could search the

entire residence based on the fact that Mr. Mclnelly had consented to searches
pursuant to the terms of his probation. That was incorrect and Ms. Moore's subsequent
acquiescence to that erroneous representation does not constitute voluntary consent.
Thus, absent a valid waiver of Ms. Moore rights, officers did not have independent
justification to conduct the warrantless search of her house, much less of her purse
pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation. Therefore, the district court erred by
not suppressing the evidence found during the illegal search.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.

State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626-27 (Ct. App. 2012).

See, e.g.,

The appellate court accepts

those findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews
the application of constitutional principles. Id. "[T]he power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court." Id.

6

C.

The Fact That Mr. Mclnelly Was On Probation And Living In Ms. Moore's House
Did Not Give Officers An Absolute Right To Search The Residence
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho

516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ).
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment unless the State
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated
exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts.

Id. at 390-91; see also

State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to
Art. I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution).
When multiple people share a residence, one person's consent to search only
extends to the property shared in common.

See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547

U.S. 103, 109 (2006); State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961, 965-66 (Ct. App. 2012). This
consent also extends to the property over which police reasonably, albeit erroneously,
believe that the person giving the consent has shared control. Id. Whether or not the
consent-giver has such apparent authority is determined by evaluating the totality of the
circumstances. Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-66. As a result, probationers cannot waive
the rights of other people with whom they cohabitate if the probationer does not have
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authority over the area or property in question. See, e.g., State v. Barker, 136 Idaho
728, 730-31 (2002); Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965. As such, Mr. Mclnelly's consent to
search the residence pursuant to the terms of his probation only extended to that
property over which he had actual or apparent control.

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109;

Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-66. Thus, the district court's
conclusion that Officer Guiberson had the "authority and responsibility to search the
home for evidence relating to possible probation violations and to determine if the
residence continued to be safe housing" (R., p.67) is directly contrary to established
precedent.
Putting aside, for the moment, the question of which rooms to which
Mr. Mclnelly's consent extended,

officers could

not have reasonably believed

Mr. Mclnelly shared control over Ms. Moore's purse. Since the methamphetamine was
found in Ms. Moore's purse, (see, e.g., R., p.64; Tr., p.26, Ls.1-7), Mr. Mclnelly's
consent to search did not justify the officer's warrantless search of that purse.

See

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109; Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152 Idaho at 96566. Therefore, absent Ms. Moore's valid consent, the search of the purse was unlawful.
However, Mr. Mclnelly's consent to search did not even extend to the bedroom in
which the purse was found.

Officers could not reasonably believe that Mr. Mclnelly

shared control over that bedroom. First, there were two bedrooms in the trailer home
and some other smaller rooms. (Tr., p.55, Ls. 7-13.) Officer Guiberson indicated that
she believed Ms. Moore, Mr. Mclnelly, and Mr. Mclnelly's son all stayed in one of the
two bedrooms. (Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.) However, Officer Guiberson admitted that the only
indication that someone besides Ms. Moore stayed in Ms. Moore's room was the

8

presence of adult male clothing in the room. 2 (Tr., p.33, Ls.16-20.) Additionally, Officer
Guiberson noticed there was only one bed in Ms. Moore's bedroom. (Tr., p.23, L.6.) In
fact, Officer Guiberson testified it would be odd for all three of them to stay in that room.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.4-5.)

Furthermore, the absence of children's clothes in that bedroom

demonstrates that Officer Guiberson's belief that Mr. Mclnelly and his young son stayed
in that room was not reasonable.

(See Tr., p.23, Ls.2-6.)

Therefore, it was not

reasonable to believe that Mr. Mclnelly had shared control over that room or the items
therein. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109; Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152
Idaho at 965-66.
Rather, it would be reasonable to believe that, as Ms. Moore indicated,
Mr. Mclnelly and his son would stay in another room when they were at that home.

(See Tr., p.23, Ls.4-5.) The evidence reveals the reasonableness of that conclusion
since there was another room furnished for Mr. Mclnelly's needs. (Tr., p.100, Ls.9-13.)
It had two beds, one child-sized and one adult-sized.

(Tr., p.100, Ls.9-13.)

In fact,

Officer Aldous testified that the teenage son who initially opened the door showed her
some of Mr. Mclnelly's clothes in one of the other bedrooms and she observed the two
beds in that room.

(Tr., p.55, Ls.1-4.)

It was also where the children's toys were

located. (Tr., p.100, Ls.9-13.) Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that was obviously the room over which Mr. Mclnelly had apparent control, and thus, the
only one of the bedrooms to which his consent to search would extend. See Randolph,
547 U.S. at 109; Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-31; Robinson, 152 Idaho at 965-66. As a
result, Mr. Mclnelly's consent to search pursuant to the terms of his probation

As Ms. Moore was married and her husband would stay in that room with her (see
(Tr., p.100, Ls.17-24), Officer Guiberson's observation of male clothing in the room does
not give rise to a reasonable inference that Mr. Mclnelly stayed in that room.

2
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agreement does not justify the warrantless search of either Ms. Moore's bedroom or her
purse.

D.

Ms. Moore's Consent Was Not Given Knowingly, Voluntarily, And Intelligently; It
Was Merely Acquiescing To A Claim Of Lawful Authority
When voluntarily granted, consent is one of the established exceptions to the

warrant requirement. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). The test for whether
consent was given freely and voluntarily given looks at the totality of the circumstances.
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996); State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 778 (Ct. App.

2006). There are several factors which may impact the determination of whether
consent was voluntary, or whether it was coerced by the officers overbearing the
defendant's will.
Idaho at 778.

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Garcia, 143

Mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority does not constitute

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent, since the claim of lawful authority
(particularly

when

falsely

or

erroneously

made)

is

inherently

coercive.

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho

112, 118 (Ct. App. 2007).

Other factors which influence whether consent was

voluntarily-given include the number of officers involved, the location, conditions, and
time at which the consent was given, whether the individual was free to leave, and
whether the individual knew of his/her right to deny consent are all factors which impact
this determination. Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778.
The totality of the circumstances indicate that Ms. Moore did not give voluntary
consent; rather, her consent was coerced. First, the officers were searching pursuant to
an erroneous claim of authority based on Mr. Mclnelly's probation waiver. (Tr., p.78,
Ls.14-17; Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10; see also Tr., p.64, Ls.21-24.) As discussed in Section C,
10

supra, officers did not have lawful authority to search the area in which the evidence

was found (Ms. Moore's purse, which was in Ms. Moore's room) pursuant to
Mr. Mclnelly's consent pursuant to his probationary release since he did not have actual
or apparent control over the bedroom or the purse.

Ms. Moore testified that Officer

Guiberson claimed the right to search her home pursuant to the terms of Mr. Mclnelly's
probation. (Tr., p.78, Ls.14-17; Tr., p.83, Ls.9-10.) There was no direct refutation of
that evidence. (See, e.g., Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15.) In fact, one of the other officers present
indicated that his impression was that the search was being conducted pursuant to the
terms of Mr. Mclnelly's probation. (Tr., p.64, Ls.21-24.) Ms. Moore also testified that
she consented to allow them to search for Mr. Mclnelly once Officer Guiberson told her
that "she had the right and that she could search anywhere she wanted in my home."
(Tr., p.78, Ls.3-21.)

As such, the evidence demonstrates that Ms. Moore only

acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority to search.

Therefore, since that was an

erroneous claim of lawful authority, any consent that Ms. Moore may have given was
coerced, and thus, was not voluntary. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49; Tietsort, 145 Idaho
at 118.
Second, Officer Guiberson admitted that she had not had Ms. Moore sign any
waiver or consent form waiving her Fourth Amendment rights as a result of having a
probationer living in her home. (Tr., p.27, L.15 - p.28, L.1.) That is important, since
Officer Foltz testified that, when searches are performed in these situations, the other
officers will rely on the probation officer to confirm to which areas the waiver of the
probationer's Fourth Amendment rights stemming from the terms of probation apply
because it is those terms that "dictate to us where we're allowed to search." (Tr., p.71,
Ls.1-21.)

Officer Foltz also testified that the general policy is to search pursuant to
11

those terms, rather than a specific consent wavier. (Tr., p.71, Ls.22-25.) Ms. Moore
testified that Officer Guiberson had also not informed her that such a term could apply if
she let her son stay with her, (Tr., p.80, Ls.6-11 ), though Officer Guiberson remembered
differently. (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-12.) However, the State bears the burden to show that this
case falls within one of the well-delineated warrant exceptions. Mincey, 437 U.S. at
390; Holton, 132 Idaho at 503-04. Therefore, the State has failed to prove that this
justification is present in this case.

As a result, this exception does not justify the

warrantless search.
Finally, the State argued below "[t]he defendant's Motion to Suppress should be
denied because [Ms.] Moore freely and voluntarily consented to the officer's search of
her purse and residence .... " (R., p.54.) However, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances reveals that was not the case. See Garcia, 143 Idaho at 778. In this
case, there were five armed officers at Ms. Moore's residence, three of whom were
inside her house. (Tr., p.40, Ls.8-18.) Only Ms. Moore and her teenage son were at
home at that time. (Tr., p.51, Ls.14-17.) Officers represented to Ms. Moore that they
could search her home pursuant to a probation waiver (Tr., p.78, Ls.14-17; Tr., p.83,
Ls.9-10), even though, as discussed supra, officers did not actually have such a waiver
for the areas and items within Ms. Moore's control in that residence.

Nonetheless.

based on Officer Guiberson's representation of authority, Ms. Moore was unaware that
she could refuse consent to search, since officers were acting under the guise of the
apparent authority of a probation waiver. Therefore, a reasonable person viewing the
totality of the circumstances would conclude that Ms. Moore did not give voluntary
consent to search her purse. The district court's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous
and should be reversed.
12

CONCLUSION
Ms. Moore respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying her motion to suppress and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1ih day of June, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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